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Abstract
One of the central goals in contemporary constitutional theory is the search for a 
democratic process that protects individual rights and guarantees from risk, while 
also defending its own integrity. There is an inherent tension between the concepts 
of constitution (understood as a mechanism that safeguards individual rights and 
liberties) and democracy (taken as collective autonomy). Some scholars have tried 
to reconcile these ideals using the notion of constitutional precommitment that defi nes 
a constitution as a self-imposed constraint put into effect by and for the people in 
order to ensure the fundamental values and conditions of democracy. This paper 
analyzes the precommitment model in constitutional theory especially according to 
the current U.S. debate.  In the fi nal analysis, adding new elements to this discussion, 
this work defends that the relationship between precommitment and collective au-
tonomy may be better understood with the redefi nition of the concepts of constitu-
tion and democracy.
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Resumo
Um dos temas que tem gerado amplo debate na fi losofi a e teoria constitucional 
contemporânea é a tentativa de impulsionar a prática da democracia e da soberania 
popular, consideradas fonte de legitimidade do poder político e do direito, sem deixar 
que os direitos e garantias individuais, assim como o próprio processo democrático, 
sejam violados. Essa questão aponta para uma tensão inerente aos conceitos de cons-
tituição (mecanismo de salvaguarda dos direitos individuais) e democracia (autono-
mia coletiva). Hodiernamente alguns autores têm entendido ser possível conciliar os 
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Introduction
Popular sovereignty is generally considered to 
be the source of the legitimacy of political power and 
law. The search for a democratic process that protects 
individual rights and guarantees from risk, while also de-
f ending its own integrity, is one of the central goals in 
the contemporary debate on constitutional philosophy 
and theory. There is an inherent tension between the 
concepts of constitution (understood as a mechanism 
that safeguards individual rights and liberties) and de-
mocracy (taken as collective autonomy). 
Some scholars have tried to reconcile these 
ideals using the notion of constitutional precommitment 
that defi nes a constitution as a self-imposed con-
straint. In other words, the constitution, by removing 
individual rights from political discussion, works as a 
self-imposed constraint put into effect by and for the 
people in order to ensure the fundamental values and 
conditions of democracy. 
This paper analyzes the precommitment model 
in constitutional theory especially according to the 
current U.S. debate. In the fi nal analys is, adding new 
elements to this debate, this work defends that the 
relationship between precommi tment and collective au-
tonomy may be better understood with the redefi  nition 
of the concepts of constitution and democracy.
I propose to study the relationship between 
constitution and collective autonomy starting from the 
debate between Stephen Holmes and Jeremy Waldron 
about the constitutional precommitment. The meth-
odological criteria of these choices can be justifi ed 
because the debate between these two authors about 
constitutional precommitment exposes the most clear 
and distinct positions in the discussion about the rela-
tionship between constitution and democracy. 
Stephen Holmes’s theory is an example of the 
“constitutional thesis” of the relationship between de-
mocracy and constitution. It holds that collective au-
tonomy should be limited in order to protect funda-
mental rights. Stephen Holmes’ theory is taken as an 
example because it shows quite clearly the constitution-
alist thesis on the relationship between constitution and 
democracy, namely that democracy and popular sover-
eignty should be limited in order to protect fundamen-
tal rights. And Holmes does this by using the precom-
mitment thesis.3
Jeremy Waldron’s theory, on the other hand, 
seeks to shift the discussion of fundamental rights into 
the political realm and his theory sheds light on the role 
of the constitution in safeguarding collective autono-
my. In the framework of Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory, Waldron is nowadays one of the leading think-
ers who are proposing to analyze the relationship be-
tween democracy and fundamental rights in political 
terms, namely, placing the focus of discussion in the 
democratic practices instead of relying on the consti-
tutional and judicial protection of fundamental rights.
The contrasts between these two approaches 
are accentuated when analyzed from the perspective 
of three concepts: constitution, democracy, and people. 
It is important to emphasize that this article analyzes 
the relationship between precommitment and collec-
tive autonomy from the perspective of Constitutional 
Philosophy. This choice has implications concerning the 
methodology, which is normative, not merely descrip-
3 Many other scholars share this understanding. See, e.g., Luigi Ferrajoli, Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Carlos Santiago Nino, Robert Alexy and Ronald Dworkin.
ideais em questão a partir da ideia de pré-compromisso constitucional, segundo a qual a 
constituição é compreendida como uma limitação autoimposta, a qual o povo coloca 
a si mesmo a fi m de assegurar as condições e valores fundamentais à própria de-
mocracia. Neste trabalho, são apresentados os principais argumentos a favor e con-
tra uma teoria constitucional pautada no modelo do pré-compromisso, sobretudo a 
partir do debate norte-americano atual. Ao fi nal, acrescentando novos elementos ao 
debate, defende-se que a relação entre pré-compromisso constitucional e autonomia 
coletiva pode ser melhor delineada a partir da redefi nição dos conceitos de consti-
tuição e de democracia. 
Palavras-chave: pré-compromisso constitucional, autonomia coletiva, democracia, 
povo.
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tive. In this way, the philosophical approach focuses on 
the analysis of arguments and concepts rather than on 
practical applications of the theories studied.
Stephen Holmes and reconciliation 
between constitutional 
precommitment and collective 
autonomy
Since the 1960s, when Hayek argued that the 
constitution is a mechanism that allows for the “appeal 
from the people drunk to the people sober” (Hayek, 
2011, p. 268), the concept of constitutional precommit-
ment has served to bring the two ideals into harmony. 
In the late 1970s and during the next two decades, the 
notion returned to the center of the debate of consti-
tutional philosophy due to the relationship established 
between precommitment and the myth of Ulysses, 
taken up from Spinoza (2002)4 by Elster (1979) and 
more recently by Holmes (1988b). 
As the myth was told by Homer, on his journey 
home to Ithaca, Ulysses wanted to hear the song of the 
sirens, but he was aware of his inability to listen to the 
melody. So, he gave precise orders to his crew to tie 
him to the mast of his ship and not to release him until 
the danger had ceased. Similarly, we use the fi gure of a 
sober person who before drinking gives her car keys to 
a friend because she knows that at the end of the night 
she will not be able to judge her capacity or not to drive. 
The examples of Ulysses and the drunk person 
are closer to the ideal advocated by constitutionalism 
when it states that the constitutional rules that protect 
rights, having been established through rational deci-
sions, should be kept out of political discussions in times 
of social commotion or a lack of rationality. Holmes, ex-
plaining these metaphors, reminds that they assimilate 
the constitution to rational agent as follows:
A constitution is Peter sober while the electorate 
is Peter drunk. Citizens need a constitution, just as 
Ulysses needed to be bound to his mast. If voters were 
allowed to get what they wanted, they would inevi-
tably shipwreck themselves. By binding themselves to 
rigid rules, they can avoid tripping over their own feet 
(Holmes, 1988b, p. 196).
Holmes, however, defends a model of consti-
tutional precommitment that departs from both the 
Ulysses and the drunkenness metaphor. He argues that 
constitutional precommitment is, instead, similar to au-
topaternalism, in which “people may voluntarily relin-
quish their ability to choose (in some matters) in order 
to accomplish their will (in other matters). Collective 
self-binding can be an instrument of collective self-rule” 
(Holmes, 1988b, p. 236). In other words: we put things 
out of sight or out of reach for the moment of tempta-
tion. For instance, we place the alarm clock across the 
room so we cannot turn it off without getting out of 
bed or, in the same way, laws which prevent employ-
ees from voluntarily consenting to work for an amount 
below the minimum wage may increase an individual’s 
capacity to get what he wants by restricting what he can 
freely choose.
Constitutional autopaternalism should be ob-
served from three viewpoints. Firstly, it does not equate 
to self-incapacitation, since constitutions have mecha-
nisms that encourage discussion, establish deadlines for 
decision-making and ultimately improve the quality of 
choices (cf. Holmes, 1988b, p. 238). Secondly, constitu-
tional provisions, such as checks and balances, are de-
signed to be superior to the virtue of the citizens and 
strength of character. Thirdly, constitutional autopater-
nalism “is intentionally designed to subserve future aims 
currently unknown” (Holmes, 1988b, p. 238). Based on 
this defi nition of constitutional precommitment as auto-
paternalism, we obtain the following concepts of consti-
tution, democracy and the people.
The constitution is not just a mechanism that 
limits power; it also creates the power and sets up its 
procedural rules. However, the restrictive aspect pre-
vails over the creative one. According to Holmes, “con-
stitutions are giant restraining orders motivated by a 
passion for avoidance. They are inevitably propelled by 
the desire to escape specifi c dangerous and unpleasant 
political outcomes” (Holmes, 1999, p. x). 
The concept of democracy is drawn from two 
complementary aspects, namely the admission of gag 
rules and self-binding (cf. Holmes, 1988a, p. 24). In this 
sense, there are benefi ts that may accrue to public life as 
a result of excluding certain issues, especially extremely 
controversial ones, from political discussion. Thus, it 
would be the negative concept of freedom, namely the 
lack of interference in some fi elds, that would set the 
tone for democracy. Then, the main feature is that, for 
democracy to exist, democratic action itself needs to 
be limited. According to Holmes, “democracy is never 
simply the rule of the people but always the rule of the 
people within certain predetermined channels, accord-
4 Spinoza’s work referred to is Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, VII/1. 
Consani |  Constitutional precommitment and collective autonomy: Can they be reconciled?
238 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 7(3):235-242
ing to certain prearranged procedures […]” (Holmes, 
1988b, p. 231). The need to impose limits relates to the 
conception of individual and people.
The defi nition of the concept of people is very 
important to the discussion about constitution and de-
mocracy. To examine this concept in the constitutional 
theories studied here, I adopt Alessandro Pinzani’s dis-
tinction between people in a diachronic sense (people un-
derstood abstractly, comprising present, past and future 
generations) and people in a synchronic sense (concrete 
individuals who form at this moment the body of citi-
zens) (cf. Pinzani, 2013, p. 138-139).5
Pinzani equates people in a diachronic sense to 
Rousseau’s general will, that which transcends the par-
ticular will of individuals, and people in a synchronic sense 
is compared to the will of all concrete individuals that 
form the body of citizens at a given historical moment. 
According to Pinzani, the danger of the diachronic per-
spective of the people is to be unable to arrive at a defi -
nition of the general will, because it becomes diffi cult 
even to establish who the people are. On the other hand, 
the risk from the perspective of the synchronic people 
would be the tyranny of the majority. So, in order to 
prevent the tyranny of the majority, fundamental rights 
are removed from the debate, leading to a confl ict be-
tween the constitution and democracy.
 In theories that see the constitution as a pre-
commitment, there is a diachronic view of people, defi ning 
the people starting from the rights guaranteed by past 
generations and that should be preserved for the pres-
ent as well as future generations. In these theories, a 
pessimistic conception of human nature predominates, 
operating based on dichotomies such as lucidity/drunk-
enness, strength and weakness of will, so that the lucid-
ity and rational will are always present in those who 
erect constitutional restrictions and abandon those 
who attempt to carry out changes.
That is to say, a rare rationality must regulate the 
lives of those who, most of the time, are not rational. 
Holmes departs from the argument of the irrational-
ity of the people as a political agent, but his defense of 
precommitment as autopaternalism maintains a certain 
distrust of collective autonomy since, although autopa-
ternalism is not based on the irrationality of the agent, 
instead he sees it stemming from a sort of weakness 
of will, which also compromises the idea of autonomy. 
In the end, constitutional precommitment is consistent 
with self-government to the extent that constitutional 
constraints are seen as self-imposed restrictions.
The strength of a theory like that of Holmes is 
that it seeks to fi nd alternatives in order to avoid either 
democracy’s self-destruction or undemocratic events 
for individuals, minorities and society in general. This 
is ensured insofar as certain issues are removed from 
popular appreciation by majority decision.6
However, one way to test the limits of a theory 
is to ascertain what would be your answers to certain 
limiting cases. A theory like that of Holmes, whose es-
sential criterion for the defi nition of democracy and its 
legitimacy is based on the evaluation of the result, would 
have to recognize as democratic even a technocracy or 
a monarchy, since it would ensure fundamental rights 
for individuals and minorities as well as the welfare of 
society in general. 
In this case it is clear that the central criterion 
of such a theory disregards one of the most commonly 
accepted characteristics of democracy, namely, popular 
sovereignty and collective autonomy linked with the 
notion of popular participation in the decision-making 
process.
Jeremy Waldron and the 
incompatibility between 
constitutional precommitment and 
collective autonomy
Unlike Holmes, Waldron argues that the consti-
tution (understood as a precommitment that sets limits 
to popular participation) and collective autonomy are 
incompatible. Analyzing constitutional precommitment, 
particularly the concept of self-limitation, Waldron 
notes that an agent limiting itself, at least temporarily, 
delegates its will to an external structure, as the crew in 
the Ulysses metaphor or even a national constitutional 
court (cf. Waldron, 1999, p. 261-266). In this way, if the 
instructions initially given are accurate, the decision of 
the external judge becomes just a means to accomplish 
the rational will of those who introduced it and thus, 
in theory, there can be no incompatibility between au-
tonomy and precommitment.
However, Waldron emphasizes that the problems 
referring to external judgment must be faced taking into 
consideration that the principles and values embedded 
5 For further discussion on people in a diachronic sense and people in a synchronic sense, see Pinzani and Consani (2013, p. 111-132).
6 The practical applications of this kind of theory can be seen in most Western democratic countries that adhere to the constitutional model, that is to say, in countries 
in which rights are protected by constitutional rules from changes promoted by democratically elected assemblies.
Consani |  Constitutional precommitment and collective autonomy: Can they be reconciled?
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 7(3):235-242                               239
in a constitution will be interpreted before the “cir-
cumstances of politics”, i.e., in situations in which there 
is political disagreement, not only in respect of issues 
of law, but also regarding those of justice and politics 
(cf. Waldron, 1999, p. 101-102). Thus, in contemporary 
societies, the necessary accuracy of the initial instruc-
tion will rarely be present in order to guarantee that 
constitutional precommitment and collective autonomy 
may be reconciled. For this reason, Waldron believes 
that the only way to avoid societies departing from the 
ideal of self-government is to allow both rights and pro-
cedures to be subject to political debate. This assump-
tion results in concepts of constitution, democracy and 
the people very different from those of Holmes.
The concept of constitution is defi ned more by 
the creative and directive aspect than the restrictive 
one. According to Waldron, written constitutions play 
an important role in politics, as they serve as a basis for 
deliberations. Thus, their role is more to strengthen pol-
itics and the government than restrict them. The word 
direction here is used in the sense in which the people 
have the right to control politics by way of the constitu-
tion. He explains this in the following excerpt:
[...] The idea of controlling the state is not necessarily 
a negative or constraining idea. If I control a vehicle, 
I determine not only where it does not go, but also 
where it does go. And if government is controlled, 
one might think that the important question is who 
is in the driving seat. [...] We may say instead that it is 
important for the government as a whole to be con-
trolled by the people and, again, we may understand 
this control as not something purely negative, but as 
a matter of articulate response to the people’s will 
(Waldron, 2009, p. 271, italics from the original text).
This defi nition of constitution is closely related 
to Waldron’s understanding of democracy. The concept 
of democracy is linked to opening up all controversial 
issues for discussion. For Waldron, democracy has to as-
sume disagreement. The author accepts that “everything 
is up for grabs in a democracy, including the rights as-
sociated with democracy itself. Or, certainly, everything 
is up for grabs which is subject of good faith disagree-
ment” (Waldron, 1999, p. 303). 
This implies the assumption of a synchronic con-
ception of people, i.e., it is accepted that all the rights, 
values and principles subject to disagreement must be 
submitted to the political debate conducted among in-
dividuals of the current generation. Thus, individuals are 
considered autonomous and responsible agents, capable 
of moral thought and, consequently, able to participate 
in the debate and in the decision-making process.
Waldron’s proposal embraces the ideal of popu-
lar sovereignty and legislative supremacy and can handle 
the problems of dealing with disagreements about the 
interpretation and weighing of rights, mainly because it 
is able to encompass and accommodate social change. In 
other words, this theory allows political disagreements 
to be evaluated and reconsidered by the political pro-
cess itself, carried out by democratically elected repre-
sentatives.7
However, also for Waldron’s theory we can pres-
ent an extreme situation that exposes its weaknesses. 
While admitting that everything is open to debate and 
that democratic legitimacy is essentially guaranteed by 
the broad popular participation, and since such decisions 
do not prevent future popular decisions, Waldron must 
admit that even a decision that withdraws the rights of 
minorities should still be considered democratic. There 
seems to be in Waldron’s theory an implicit normative 
base that is not reasoned, because the question is al-
ways about the meaning of a reasonable or good-faith 
disagreement and how much this notion has normative 
force to restrict certain positions. If this notion can be 
the object of a majority decision, then any decision of 
the majority can be considered guided by reasonable 
disagreement.8
Moreover, as Waldron recognizes, his theory 
lacks an adequate discussion of political representa-
tion (see Waldron, 1999, p. 110, footnote 60). Without 
rethinking representative democracy, it becomes prob-
lematic to confer such power to the legislature, because 
the design of the legislature needs to ensure not only 
the popular control over the representatives but also 
ways to develop and qualify the political debate. This is 
because the political will of the people cannot be taken 
simply as something given a priori: it must be the result 
of a process which, in turn, creates a democratic politi-
cal culture. The proper functioning of a theory of con-
stitutional democracy must presuppose a democratic 
political culture, which should be encouraged by its own 
democratic institutions.9
7 The practical applications of this kind of theory can be seen in countries like England or New Zealand, where the legislative power has a strong role in protecting rights, 
mainly because these countries have a different judicial review system. As pointed out by Waldron, in these countries “courts may scrutinize legislation for its conformity 
to individual rights but they may not decline to apply it (or moderate its application) simply because rights would otherwise be violated” (Waldron, 2006, p. 1355).
8 This limitation is also pointed out by Christiano (2000, p. 513-543).
9 János Kis (2009, p. 570-594) also criticizes Waldron in this sense.
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Final considerations
A way to escape the problems pointed out in the 
theories of Holmes and Waldron is to outline a theory 
of constitutional democracy derived from the redefi ni-
tion of the concepts of constitution and democracy. On 
the one hand, the constitution  must be understood as a 
political framework which includes mechanisms for the 
protection and accomplishment of rights and not as a 
normative legal framework within which politics oper-
ates. In the former view, the protection and realization 
of rights fall inside rather than outside politics.10
On the other hand, it is necessary to rethink 
democratic practices  reshaping the political-institution-
al arrangement in contemporary democratic societies, 
complementing representative democracy with for-
mal channels for direct popular participation in which 
citizens can exercise more control over the elected 
representatives and also more infl uence over political 
decisions. Moreover, it is argued that this new political-
institutional arrangement is directly related to a change 
in how one understands central elements  within the 
very concept of democracy, such as people and will. My 
purpose then is to build an association between the 
concepts of people and will that confers more credibil-
ity to popular participation in political decisions than is 
given it in our times. 
Returning to Pinzani’s concepts of diachronic 
and synchronic people, the problems pointed out can 
be avoided by separating the concept of people from 
the concept of will. Thus, the most appropriate category 
would be one that can be called synchronic people with 
diachronic will. In this category, the synchronism related 
to the concept of people allows the constitution to be 
considered a living document, open to change. On the 
other hand, the diachronic element of will ensures that 
opening the constitution to the people need not imply 
the loss or suppression of fundamental rights nor the 
destruction of democracy itself. I consider this to be 
the most appropriate concept for a society that neither 
wants to subjugate democratic aspects to the legal ones 
nor wants to expose itself to the tyranny of the majority.
This synthesis between synchronism and dia-
chronism stems from the work of the Enlightenment 
philosopher Condorcet. The underpinning for the fol-
lowing analysis is found in Condorcet’s “Outline for the 
French Constitution of 1793”. This text is a compila-
tion of the constitutional ideas of this thinker. The major 
theoretical contribution of Condorcet to this debate is 
what we might call institutional thought (cf. Condorcet, 
1994, p. 228-234).
Condorcet builds a constitutional theory carefully 
outlining a set of institutions, i.e., he sets up many chan-
nels for the expression of popular sovereignty, for the 
limitation of power, for the resolution of confl icts and 
concomitantly for the protection of rights. His proposal 
was the establishment of an intermediate model between 
the positions favorable to the removal of fundamental 
rights from the political debate or the exercise of popular 
sovereignty with no protection for these rights. 
The powers in Condorcet’s constitutional theory 
are not divided merely into constituent and constituted 
power, but they can be classifi ed as powers retained (with 
the people), common powers (exercised both by the peo-
ple as well as by representatives) and delegated power 
(basically, constituted powers: legislative, executive and 
judicial).11 In this theory, all these powers derive from 
the constituent power, but what is unique is precisely 
the existence of retained and common powers, otherwise 
called positive and negative powers.12
The retained powers are exercised directly by 
the people and consist of the enjoyment of four rights: 
censorship and popular initiative in legislative matters 
(always exercised ex post facto, i.e., subsequent to the 
enactment of a law by the legislature); consultative ref-
erendum (through which the legislature requests the 
people’s opinion about an issue of general interest), the 
right of petition, and lastly the right to demand the trial 
of public offi cials in case of abuse of power and violation 
of the law. The common powers exercised by the people 
and the representatives are those related to constitu-
tional review. Condorcet argues that the constitution 
must undergo review with a certain frequency, and this 
is taken as a condition for the improvement of political 
and legal institutions established and safeguarded by it.
These powers give the people the permanent 
right of decision and direct interference in the direction 
of politics. In this way, popular action can occur not only 
as a result of the action of the people’s representatives 
but also by the people themselves when necessary, i.e., 
the direct participation of the people can occur concomi-
tantly with its indirect action. In other words, the formal 
channels of popular participation created constitutionally 
confer a synchronic character upon the people.
10 For further discussion on the political form of constitutions, see Bellamy (1996, p. 436-456; 2007).
11 This classifi cation is made by Alengry (1904, p. 476).
12 For further discussion on positive and negative powers in Condorcet’s theory, see Urbinati (2006, p. 213ff.).
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The concept of synchronic people, as already seen, 
also has limitations that may be associated with the tyr-
anny of the majority. However, with the synchronic char-
acter the people’s actions may have their weaknesses 
remedied by the diachronic nature of will as guided by 
deliberation. Condorcet pointed out that the delibera-
tion process can produce not only the will but also the 
judgment of the citizens.13 This is mainly possible due 
to the wide range of places of deliberation and deci-
sion-making (the primary assemblies of each municipal 
section, municipalities and departments) in combination 
with the time delay between resolutions. 
Such mechanisms fi lter the level of public inter-
est in the particular draft of a proposed law, in an act 
of legislative censorship, or even in the trial of a public 
offi cial. These mechanisms also prevent overly hasty de-
cisions from being taken and avoid any chaos caused 
by a specifi c situation, i.e., they maximize the diachronic 
element of will that should be formed through the pro-
cess of deliberation.
The democratic institutions shaping the syn-
chronic people are of central importance to the demo-
cratic ideal. This is especially true because they contrib-
ute to the political education of citizens by producing 
democratic habits.14 However, the democratic constitu-
tion is not suffi ciently adequate to deal with the prob-
lems arising from a merely synchronic act of the people, 
as pointed out earlier. In turn, the diachronic element 
alone is similarly unable to produce results, since it is, 
in fact, mere content and therefore requires a form in 
which to express the will. Thus, it is useless to develop 
an excellent method of deliberation and to have a highly 
enlightened people in a state whose constitution does 
not provide adequate institutions for popular partici-
pation. For that reason, synchronic and diachronic ele-
ments must complement each other.
Based on these categories (synchronic people 
with diachronic will) I suppose it is possible to draw a 
more circular relationship between the constituent el-
ements of the concept of constitution and those of the 
concept of democracy. The people, thought synchro-
nously, is defi ned (in the sense of created, constituted) 
by democratic institutions founded by the constitution. 
In other words, the synchronism of the people is de-
fi ned by the shape of the democratic constitution. The 
diachronic will, in turn, is a content built using a meth-
od of voting and deliberation. This content needs to be 
built within the democratic institutions which involve 
the process of discussion and deliberation. It is also im-
portant that these democratic institutions cooperate 
with the formation of citizens. Here lies the circular-
ity: the democratic ideal, put into practice through the 
synchronic people, fi nds limits in the diachronic will, 
which works simultaneously protecting the rights and 
the democratic process.
Thereby, considering the debate between 
Holmes and Waldron and also the relationship between 
constitutional precommitment and collective autonomy, 
this approach can be considered a third way. Like in 
Holmes’ theory, it seeks to protect rights and demo-
cratic practices against the irresponsible action of the 
people. On the other hand, like in Waldron’s theory, 
this protection does not imply any sort of reduction in 
popular participation in very important and divergent 
political decisions. We can fi nd, of course, this attempt 
to reconcile the ideals of fundamental rights and popu-
lar sovereignty in the work of great theorists, such as 
Jürgen Habermas.15 However, Habermas’ model of de-
liberative politics does not institutionalize citizen con-
trol of the process of democratic decision-making and 
such institutionalization seems to be a very important 
contribution in the context of this debate. 
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